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CRIMINAL LAW: JUSTIFIABLE BATTERY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court clarified two issues: [1] whether battery is justifiable in self-defense under the 
same conditions that would justify homicide, and [2] when proposed jury instructions should be 
accepted by the trial court regarding justifiable battery. 
 
Disposition 
 
First, battery is justifiable in self-defense under the same conditions that would justify homicide. 
Second, when proposed instructions are legally correct and in accordance with state statutes, 
supported by evidence, and not substantially covered by other instructions, a court errs in 
refusing to give the proposed instructions. 
  
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellant Keonis Davis and Damien Rhodes had an altercation that resulted in Davis 
shooting Rhodes in the chest.  Before the incident, Davis had heard from others that Rhodes 
wanted to cause him physical harm.  Davis had previously witnessed Rhodes violently beating 
someone.  Davis was also aware that Rhodes carried a gun, and he previously witnessed Rhodes 
shoot at someone.  Davis had also heard from others that Rhodes wanted to kill him.      
 According to Davis, the altercation occurred after Davis informed Rhodes that he did not 
have the money he owed him.  Rhodes then attempted to start a fight, and both men indicated to 
each other that they had guns.  Davis tried walking away, but Rhodes chased after him and 
punched Davis in the head, continuing to attack him even after Davis tried to walk away again.  
Davis then pulled his gun out and tried to chamber the round, but the gun jammed.  Davis tried 
unjamming the gun, but it fired and the bullet hit Rhodes in the chest.  Davis fled the scene.   
 Rhodes claimed Davis initiated the physical altercation by shooting his gun andthat Davis 
stood over him and attempted to shoot him two more times but his gun jammed. Witnesses 
testified to both versions of the incident, and the firearms expert could not discern whether the 
gun jammed before or after Davis fired the single bullet.  Rhodes survived the shooting.   
 During the jury trial, Davis proposed two jury instructions regarding justifiable infliction 
of bodily harm.  The district court rejected the proposed instructions as confusing even though 
the instructions mirrored Nevada’s self-defense statutory language nearly verbatim.  The district 
court only provided the instructions set forth in Runion v. State,
2
 which addressed murder and 
attempted murder in self defense, but not justifiable battery.   
 
Discussion 
 
 The district court erred in refusing to give Davis’ proposed justifiable battery 
instructions 
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  By Danielle Barraza. 
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  116 Nev. 1041, 1051-52, 13 P.3d 52, 59 (2000).  
  Davis argues that by rejecting his proposed instructions on justifiable infliction of bodily 
harm, the district court committed reversible error.  The State claims that the instructions were 
properly denied because “1) there was no evidence to support a self-defense instruction; 2) the 
instructions misstated the law because deadly forced cannot be used where no threat of a felony 
involving substantial bodily harm or death exists; and 3) Davis’ theory of self-defense theory 
was substantially covered by the given instructions.”   
 The district court has discretion to review jury instructions for abuse of discretion or 
judicial error.
3
  Reviews of whether an instruction was an accurate statement of law are 
conducted de novo.
4
 
 
 Davis presented evidence of self-defense 
 
It is not necessary for death to occur in order to garner a self-defense instruction.
5
  NRS 
200.275 unambiguously provides that “[i]n addition to any other circumstances recognized as 
justification at common law, the infliction or threat of bodily injury is justifiable and does not 
constitute mayhem, battery or assault, if done under circumstances which would justify 
homicide.”6 (emphasis in opinion).  
 A defendant also has the right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case 
regardless of how weak the evidence may be.
7
  Davis’ theory was that he was afraid Rhodes 
would shoot or beat him to death and that shooting his gun was a necessary act.  Davis testified 
to this theory by contending that he had previously witnessed Rhodes punch another person; that 
Rhodes had previously challenged Davis to a fight; that Davis had heard Rhodes wanted to kill 
him; that Davis knew Rhodes carried a gun; that Rhodes instigated the argument; that Rhodes 
indicated he was carrying a gun at the incident; that Rhodes instigated the fight even after Davis 
informed him he was armed and was trying to walk away; and that Rhodes punched Davis in the 
head.  Based on this evidence, the Court concluded Davis was entitled to self-defense 
instructions, as “evidence from the defendant alone need not be supported by other independent 
evidence.”8 
 The State asserts that Davis was barred from claiming self-defense because Rhodes’ 
conduct did not amount to a felony.  However, a person may use a sufficient amount of 
resistance to prevent an offense against his or her person, and if the resistance is homicide, it is 
justifiable if “the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person.”9  
Also, as a question of fact, it was for the jury to determine if Davis believed he was in fear of 
death or bodily harm, or whether he was defending against an attempt by Rhodes to commit a 
felony. 
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  Davis’ proposed jury instructions did not misstate Nevada law 
 
 The district court only put forth the Runion instructions, which address self-defense for 
attempted murder, whereas here both attempted murder and battery were before the jury.  Davis’ 
first proposed instruction stated that infliction of bodily injury is justifiable if done under 
circumstances that would justify homicide.  Davis’ second proposed instruction expanded on the 
definition of justifiable homicide, such as self-defense against an individual who intends to 
commit a felony.  The district court concluded that although the proposed instructions mirrored 
Nevada’s justifiable homicide statutes, the statutes were overbroad because deadly force is not 
justifiable when exercised to prevent nonviolent felonies.   
 However, this case did not present the question of whether battery is justifiable when 
used to defend against a nonviolent felony, as Davis thought Rhodes was going to attack him, 
causing bodily injury or death if he did not act.  Davis’ interpretation was legally correct and 
aligned with the current statutes.
10
 Thus, there was no misstatement of Nevada law. 
  
 Davis’ justifiable battery theory was not substantially covered by other instructions 
 
The district court may refuse a jury instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if 
other instructions substantially cover the refused instruction.
11
  The State claims that language in 
the jury instructions for “attempted killing” included conduct that formed the basis for the battery 
charge, making a separate self-defense instruction unnecessary.  The State contends that Davis 
unlawfully attempting to shoot Rhodes more than once was the factual basis for both the 
attempted murder charge and the battery charge. 
However, the State pleaded that the battery charge arose because Davis fired the gun at 
Rhodes, striking him in the chest.  Therefore, the jury instructions would have been insufficient 
if the jury believed that Davis only meant to shoot Rhodes in self-defense — not to kill him — as 
only justifiable killing was covered in the instructions, not justifiable battery.  The first proposed 
instruction would have informed the jury that infliction of bodily harm is not a battery if done in 
self-defense.
12
  The second proposed instruction would have illuminated the justifiable homicide 
circumstances in connection with the first instruction, which states that battery is justified “if 
done under circumstances which justify homicide.”  Thus, the proposed instructions were not 
already covered in the accepted instructions.   
  
 The district court’s rejection of Davis’ proposed jury instructions was not harmless and 
constitutes reversible error 
  
 An error is harmless if the court determines that, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not 
contribute to the defendant’s conviction.13  The court could not conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that rejection of the instructions did not contribute to Davis’ conviction.  While the 
approved self-defense instructions only referenced “killing” and “attempted killing,” the 
proposed instructions would have informed the jury about justifiable battery.  The jurors might 
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have found that Davis acted in self-defense on the attempted murder charge because that was the 
only charge available for a self-defense finding, or they might have specifically rejected Davis’ 
self-defense theory regarding battery, but found he lacked the specific intent to kill necessary for 
the attempted murder charge. Because of this ambiguity, the district court’s error in dismissing 
Davis’ proposed jury instructions was not harmless and thus constitutes reversible error.  
Conclusion 
 
 The district court erred here because Davis’ proposed jury instructions were in 
accordance with NRS, supported by evidence, and not substantially covered in other instructions.  
Thus, the jury should have been given instructions regarding justifiable infliction of bodily harm. 
Reversed and remanded to the district Court for a new trial.  
